The fears for their fate should they fall into the hands of the ruthless Arab enemy; the belief of Ben-Gurion, Yisrael Galili and others, that these were the mothers of the next generation; the lack of cooperation on the part of commanders who demeaned their abilities—and perhaps also the masculine need for the glory of victory, the incessant praise for their sacrifice, the constant encouragement of the women—combined to prevent women from realizing themselves in a field where they felt they had much to offer: the battlefield.
The exclusion of women from combat roles was frustrating and painful, especially after they had gone through so much training and were in a state of advanced combat readiness. In time of battle, their womanliness was obscured: their similarity to the male warrior was manifest not only in their outward appearance, i. This led to a loss of their feminine identity in the eyes of the men. In general, the women made a point of dressing in a sloppy, careless manner, without fuss or attention to their appearance another reason for this was that one of their primary functions was to conceal weapons under their clothing.
True, there were some who disguised themselves as men so as not to be separated from their comrades-in-arms, but this phenomenon was not widespread. On the contrary, most women of the period used their womanliness as a tool for advancing the cause of the Haganah. The men were much more appreciative of a woman who held a cup of tea in her hand than of one who scrambled from peak to peak holding a STEN gun. The presence of women on the battlefield was problematic not only because the members of the Haganah and the Palma h were unenthusiastic about such a move but because of its potential impact on the Arab enemy, who would supposedly be inflamed at the sight of a woman fighter, as Yona Golani, a member of the Palma h , attested.
Women were sent into battle at the discretion of the local field commander. Whether or not they made it to the front was determined by their degree of success in convincing the commander that they were worthy and capable of taking part in, and contributing to, the fighting. In the view of the women, the later decision to keep them off the battlefield led to their exclusion from combat tasks and the preservation of their inferior status on the home front, in service occupations. This decision in fact substantiates the assessment that the acceptance of women in combat roles at an earlier point was only a temporary emergency measure.
For this reason, the women made super-human efforts not to fail or break down. I must not provide a pretext [for criticism] against the girls. His comment proves that there was no unequivocal decision to remove women from the front during the War of Independence. While there was a directive from Ben-Gurion on the subject, it was not always enforced and the matter was frequently subject to the discretion of individual commanders.
If the commanders were opposed to women in masculine roles, they would obviously not agree to include women in combat activities. The opinion of such commanders as Uri Ben-Ari, Jimmy Aharon Shemi and others shifted from one extreme to the other after they witnessed the devotion of the women and their contributions on the battlefield. The decision to totally remove women from the battlefield became an established fact only after the War of Independence.
Yigal Allon was unaware when he made his remark that in the next war not only married women but also women in general would not go into battle. Thus the attitude toward women in combat can be reduced to the following principles: Motherhood took priority over security needs; it was just as important as active participation in the war effort because of the lofty goal of survival of the nation.
If women were being mobilized in any event since not all of them were mothers , they were generally directed towards rearguard positions so as to free the men for the battlefield.
In times of emergency, there was a greater openness and flexibility regarding the placement of women in masculine positions, in accordance with the opinion of the individual commander. The answer to this question is that not only the women of Ha-Shomer an earlier Jewish self-defense force, founded in were surprised to discover that the promised equality was only pretty words on paper; the women of the Haganah and the Palma h also came to realize that equality was an important principle—but not a realistic one.
One must, however, be wary of applying the concepts of present-day feminism to the Palma h generation. The very fact that the women were there at the battle positions and command posts, where they combined their traditional roles with combat duties, symbolized, for them, the ideal of equality. The sense of inclusion and camaraderie, of personal contribution to the best of their ability—sometimes to the point of self-sacrifice—gave the women the feeling that they had carried out their mission to the fullest.
Even those who held that the equality being offered them was imperfect, and that there existed a gap between reality and the expressed commitment to equality between the sexes, avoided engaging in criticism. Amid the storm of battle and the need for full-scale national involvement, they did not preoccupy themselves with questions of equality and did not protest the traditional roles allocated to them.
At the same time, there were individual women who were interested specifically in being included in military operations; when they encountered male opposition, they were left with the bitter taste of the mythical equality. And since the bulk of the women engaged in these occupations, they have been neglected by researchers and their contribution virtually ignored by the history books. For since when do people write of the unsung heroes who toil behind the scenes?
Nor has much been documented about the women fighters themselves. They were truly few in number—maybe one per division, on average. While the myth of the woman on the battlefield in is known to every child in Israel, no one can say what they actually did there.
In addition to the fact that history has not devoted much space to such trifles as the service occupations filled by women in the Haganah, the women themselves did not seek publicity. They took part in all spheres of activity, from transporting and cleaning weapons, giving training courses, tending to the fighters and engaging in active combat when the occasion arose, to the more monotonous tasks of cooking and cleaning, raising morale through song and encouragement and bringing warmth and interest to the dreary routine of the fighters.
The importance of the women went beyond their filling the ranks of the Haganah, which were greatly diminished in battle. Their contribution lay in the fact that they brought a different spirit to the Haganah and the Palma h —a spirit of devotion and sacrifice, courage, willingness to fulfill any task, warmth and gentleness, an attentive ear and the desire to prove themselves and excel at everything.
There is no question that without the added impact of the women, the defensive force of the Yishuv would not have succeeded in carrying out its missions with the same degree of success, given the complex reality of the times.
The myth of the fighting women of the Palma h persists to this day. As stated, the number of women fighters in the Haganah and the Palma h was actually very small, and for the most part, their fight was for the right to take part in actual combat; as a result, they could not really have participated in all operations.
This myth is fed by yet another myth that still exists, namely, the myth of equality between the sexes in the State of Israel. Those who have contributed to the creation of this myth include historians, sociologists, women themselves, the labor movement and so on. In and of itself, the military role of women in the pre-State period was limited; but it was also merely a way station along the road to their true destiny—tending to the next generation. This myth can have great educational value, especially for those young people unfamiliar with the Palma h generation; but we must nonetheless take pains to ensure historical accuracy and keep the myth in perspective.
Avigdori-Avidov, Hadasa. Ba-derekh she-halakhnu The Path We Walked. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, , Eshel, Tsadok. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, Peleg, Avraham, editor.
Rishon le-Zion: The Haganah Organization, Rattok, Lily. What is HagAnaH Apex? Nucleus Modules: F. More Testimonials. Who Is Mike Lee Kanarek? The Israeli Tactical Knife Program is restricted to law enforcement, military and approved civilians. This program teaches use of the knife as a defensive tool and as an offensive weapon for military.
ITK covers all facets of using a knife against an assailant who is also armed with a knife from effective deployment strategies to using reverse grip tactics to draw the attacker into an effective counterattack. Knife-fighting training is an excellent way to develop a keen understanding of how a knife is used in an attack. It is also a great way to develop a sense of the flow of an assault with a knife, improve footwork for all programs, and improve recognition of knife motion and patterns.
This is a critical ability to possess and to develop for the empty hand versus knife tactics taught in the F. This course teaches the Israeli system of Counter-Terror warfare using the semi automatic pistol and assault rifle, as done in the Israel Defense Forces Duvdevan unit.
It is an aggressive system that has its philosophies deeply rooted in the idea that distance to the threat must be closed at all costs to be an effective counter terror fighting machine. The Israeli method is one that puts human ability and programmability at the top of its training priorities. Students are taught to use their natural instincts matched with motor memory to react to the stimulus and neutralize the threat.
During , the years of the Arab Revolt , were the years in which the Haganah matured and developed from a militia into a military body. Although the British administration did not officially recognize the organization, the British Security Forces cooperated with it by establishing civilian militia.
In the summer of , Special Night Squads — S. Haganah guarding a position near Migdal Tzedek During the years of the riots, the Haganah protected the establishment of more than 50 new settlements in new area of the country see Homa Umigdal — Stockade and Watchtower Settlements.
As a result of the British government Anti-Zionist policy, expressed in the White Paper of , the Haganah supported illegal immigration and organized demonstrations against the British Anti-Zionist policy.
It headed a movement of volunteers, from which Jewish units were formed for service in the British army see Jewish Brigade Group. It also cooperated with British intelligence units and sent its personnel out on various commando missions in the Middle East. Another example of this cooperation was the dropping of 32 Jewish parachutists in behind enemy lines in the Balkans, Hungary and Slovakia see also Hannah Szenesh , Enzo Sereni , Havivah Reik.
Haganah fighters At the same time, the Haganah further strengthened its independece during the war.
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